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A Perfect Storm
● End of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement
○ New Trade/Competitive Pressures
●New Supply Chain Organization
○ Disaggregation and Concentration of Supply Chains
○ Strategic Partners and “Rationalized” Supply Chains
●Changes in Garment Markets
○ Increased Speed of Fashion Cycles - Lean Retailing
●Changes in Factory Organization & Management
○ Lean Manufacturing
●Accelerating Sourcing Pressures and Impacts
●Major Changes in Nature of Competitiveness
● Simultaneous Changes in Systems for Compliance
Codes & Monitoring
●Voluntary Codes of Conduct - 1991-present
● Internal Monitoring
●External Monitoring
●Multi-stakeholder Initiatives
○ Fair Labor Association, Social Accountability Intl (SA8000), 
Ethical Trading Initiative, Worldwide Responsible Apparel 
Production (WRAP), Fair Wear Foundation, Workers Rights 
Consortium, Global Union Framework Agreements
●Reporting Initiatives
○ Global Compact, Global Reporting Initiative
●Expanding Across Sectors
○ Coffee, Chocolate, Wood, Diamonds, Electronics, etc. etc. 
Gains and Limitations
●Reducing some “Sweatshop” Conditions
○ Most Glaring Health and Safety Problems
○ Physical and Verbal Abuse of Workers
○ Basic Compliance with Laws
●Changes in Disclosure, Reporting, & Responsibility
●But Critical Issues Remain
○ Wage Violations, Overtime, Discrimination, Freedom of 
Association
○ Nike. Gap. FLA. 
●Continued Non-Compliance
○ Haven’t Dealt with Root Causes
● Pyrrhic Victories
●Continued Pressures Downward
Structural Barriers
●Corporate Monitoring Structurally Flawed
○ Potential Conflicts of Interest
● Problems Embedded in Structure of Industry
○ Prices Going Down. Delivery Times Going Down.
○Compliance Demands Going Up. 
● Incentives are Contradictory 
● Factories Quite Simply Can’t Comply and 
Survive
○University Experiences. Corporate Experiences. 
● Policing Model Neither Builds Motivation or 
Capacity of Firms to Comply
● Incentives to Cover Up Problems
The Example of WRAP
●Little Transparency
●No Sanctions for Failure to Comply
●Monitors Paid by those Monitored
● Poorly Trained Monitors who Visit Rarely
●No Worker Advocates Involved
○No Unions or NGOs Involved
○ Inadequate Worker Interviews
● Focus on Self-Assessments
●Little Focus on Remediation
●No Evidence of Addressing Root Causes
Realigning Processes and Incentives
●Deeper Monitoring
●Root Cause Analysis
○ Evaluating Pressures/Constraints in Supply Chain
●Collaborative Problem Solving
○Real Worker Participation
●New Incentives to Find and Solve Problems
○ Paying More. Longer-term Contracts. More Stable 
Contracts. Order Leveling.
●Building the Capacity of Factories to Comply
●New Institutions for Implementation
Moving Forward
●Greater Disclosure and Transparency
●Greater Public Accountability
● Independent Monitoring
●Worker Participation & Empowerment
●Root Cause Analysis => to Sourcing
●Collaborative Problem Solving
●Direct Incentives for Compliance
●Responsible Sourcing
● Integrating Compliance and Competitiveness
